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Are Propositions Essentially Representational? 
Bryan Pickel 
Areas: Metaphysics of Propositions, Philosophy of Language 
Abstract: King (2007, 2009, 2012) argues that nothing has truth conditions 
except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But—for good 
reason—King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and 
intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a 
proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of 
truth conditions can’t follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the 
proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that 
motivates positing propositions. Or, there is no need to explain what bestows a 
truth condition on a proposition. 
 
 Propositions play a number of important roles in our theories. Among other 
things, they are meant to be the objects of attitudes, the semantic contents of sentences 
in context, and the primary truth bearers. One feature common to many of these roles is 
that propositions are meant to be pieces of information. To interpret a belief state or a 
sentence is to determine what information is carried by the state or expressed by the 
sentence. The truth conditions of the belief state or sentence vary with the piece of 
information carried. If propositions are pieces of information, then their truth 
conditions are not so variable. The truth-value of a proposition directly depends on the 
world. Let us say that on the traditional conception of propositions, they have truth 
conditions essentially and intrinsically. Namely, a proposition’s existence necessitates its 
having its truth conditions and any duplicate of a proposition must have the same truth 
conditions. 
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But how can an entity be essentially and intrinsically representational? On the 
traditional view, a proposition also has its truth conditions inherently: the truth 
conditions of a proposition are bestowed by its very nature and not by anything outside 
of it.1 In a series of works, King (2007, 2009, 2012, 2014a,b) has been sharply crucial of 
this sort of approach: ‘no one has ever been able to explain how anything could have 
truth conditions by its very nature and independently of minds and languages’ (2014a: 
47). 
Yet, King (2007: 60-1; 2012; 2014b: 186) is explicit that he wants an account on 
which propositions have truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. Attempting to 
thread the needle, he holds that propositions have truth conditions essentially and 
intrinsically, but not inherently.  
[O]n my account the representational capacity of propositions is derived from 
something outside them. But […] having the truth conditions it has is an intrinsic 
(and essential) property of a proposition. (King 2007: 131) 
If King could make good on this promise, then he would have a compelling account of 
propositions. 
 I show that this combination is untenable. Propositions, as King assays them, 
have their truth conditions neither essentially nor intrinsically. To repair the proposal, 
one must hold that there is an inexplicable necessary connection forcing agents to 
interpret the proposition or that rational agents have a self-referential attitude.  The 
first view seems to return to the traditional conception that propositions have their 
truth conditions inherently. The second view is implausible. The failure of King’s 
attempt leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that motivates positing 
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propositions. Or, King’s seemingly formidable problem is in fact a pseudo-problem: 
there is no need to explain what bestows a truth condition on a proposition.2  
 
I. Propositions as Essentially Representational 
 
 In this section, I outline the conception of propositions as pieces of information. 
My aim is to make plausible the idea that in order to perform their function, 
propositions have their truth conditions essentially. As I have mentioned, King argues 
that propositions have their truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. The 
intrinsically of truth conditions is an interesting thesis, and I argue in §V that this 
intrinsicality also conflicts with the view that the possession of truth conditions is not 
inherent. But, my focus will be on the essentiality of truth conditions. 
It is most natural to bring this essentiality out by contrasting propositions with 
sentences. The truth of a sentence such as (J) ‘Mario jumps’ results partly from the state 
of the world. Given that (J) conveys the information that Mario jumps, it is true if and 
only if he jumps. It is false if he fails to jump. Yet, the sentence might have conveyed 
different information. The sentence would then have had different truth conditions. For 
instance, the meanings of its vocabulary might have been different. Had speakers used 
‘Mario’ differently—referring to, say, Luigi—then (J) would have expressed the 
information that Luigi jumps. (J) would have been true iff Luigi jumps.  
 The truth conditions of a sentence depend on human activities in subtler ways. 
King (2007) argues that the meanings of the expressions in a sentence fail to fix its truth 
conditions. Grant that ‘Mario’ refers to Mario and ‘jumps’ expresses the property of 
jumping. The truth conditions of sentence (J) are still open because the semantic 
significance of concatenation, which relates these expressions to form a sentence, has 
not been specified. English speakers take a sentence that results from subject-predicate 
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concatenation to express the information that the subject term instantiates the property 
expressed by the predicate. King (2007: 35; 2009: 261) imagines speakers who take 
such sentences to express the information that the referent of the subject term fails to 
instantiate the property expressed by the predicate. Construed as a sentence of that 
language, (J) would be true iff Mario doesn’t jump. Concatenation means what it does in 
English because ‘when English speakers confront other cases of syntactically 
concatenated expressions, they spontaneously and unreflectively compose the semantic 
values of the concatenated expressions in characteristic ways’ (King 2012: 4).3 
 According to an influential tradition, the information conveyed by a sentence is a 
proposition. King (2007: 1-2) says in motivating the view that there are propositions: 
What piece of information a sentence encodes […] together with the way the 
world is determine whether it is true or false. If propositions exist, we can 
identify them with these pieces of information and make sense of this. 
Sentences express propositions […] and propositions are true or false 
depending on how the world is. 
While the truth-value of a sentence depends on both convention and the world, the 
truth-value of a proposition depends on the world straightaway. Propositions are not 
double-indexed—as it were—so that the world determines both under what conditions 
they are true and whether those conditions obtain. 
As King says, once the information expressed by a sentence is fixed, the state of 
the world determines the sentence’s truth-value. Once the information is specified, the 
truth conditions are thereby specified as well. A natural picture, then, is that the piece of 
information has its truth conditions essentially. If propositions are identical to pieces of 
information, then they should have their truth conditions essentially as well. 
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 Speaks (2014: 150ff) offers further considerations in favor of the view that 
propositions have their truth conditions essentially. The argument proceeds from 
considering the unnaturalness of assertions such as (J*).4 
(J*) It is possible that the proposition that Mario jumps exists and is not true 
even though Mario jumps. 
 
If we accept that pieces of information have their truth conditions essentially and that 
propositions are pieces of information, then it is possible to explain why sentences such 
as (J*) seem infelicitous. At any rate, it is a desideratum for any successful theory of 
propositions that it preserve the essential and intrinsic connection between 
propositions and their truth conditions.  
 
II. King’s Objection to the Traditional View 
According to the traditional conception, propositions represent the world by 
their natures. As King says, these traditional views portray representation—the 
possession of truth conditions—as an inherent property of propositions, not due to 
anything outside of them. King (2007: 32-3, footnote 13; 2009: 259-60; 2012) argues 
that the traditional view faces a formidable explanatory challenge: how can anything 
have truth conditions inherently?  
In this section, I develop King’s objections, which issue from the thought that 
nothing can have truth conditions unless it is taken to have truth conditions by rational 
agents. Or weaker, nothing can have truth conditions unless rational agents are 
disposed to take it as having truth conditions. So as I develop King’s objection, I want to 
establish that he is committed to something like the following thesis: 
Necessarily: (x has truth conditions only if agents are disposed to take x as 
having truth conditions). 
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I will elaborate King’s objections as directed against traditional versions of possible 
world views of propositions, structured complex views, and the sort of attitude based 
account recently developed by Soames. In all of these cases, he objects that the target 
entities to be identified with propositions cannot have truth conditions independently 
of the dispositions of rational agents. When King attacks the sort of account developed 
by Soames, he is more explicit. The dispositions must be to take the target entities 
(rather than suitably related entities) as true or false. 
Some traditional theorists would say that propositions are sets of possible worlds 
(Stalnaker 1970/1999: 32-3). These theorists might hold that it follows from the 
description of a proposition as a set of worlds that it is true if the actual world is a 
member of it and false otherwise. But King (2012: §3) points out that one could take 
either a set of worlds or its complement to represent the truth conditions of a single 
sentence.5 One might take the set of worlds in which Mario jumps to be represented by 
the sentence ‘Mario does not jump’. Thus, sets of worlds don’t determine truth 
conditions except by being subject to certain interpretive conventions. And King is 
doubtful that non-philosophers actually engage in interpreting sets of worlds. 
Others say that propositions are structured wholes composed either of objects 
and properties such as Mario and jumping or of proxies for these objects and 
properties.6 These theorists often say that propositions thereby inherently represent 
the objects as instantiating the properties. Thus, ‘Mario jumps’ expresses the 
proposition that Mario jumps, which intrinsically is true just in case Mario jumps. King 
points out that many structured complexes (sets and ordinary mereological sums) lack 
truth conditions. He seeks an explanation of why the target structured complexes have 
truth conditions. For the most part, he can’t find one that doesn’t appeal to the 
interpretive dispositions of rational agents.  
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 King also criticizes Soames (2010), whom he reads as arguing that propositions 
are mental state types, which inherit their truth conditions from mental state tokens 
with inherent representational properties. King objects on both fronts. First, King 
(2012: 90) objects ‘that the event tokens [...] inherently have truth conditions is just 
mysterious. I can see how event tokens could have truth conditions in virtue of agents 
interpreting them in certain ways. But how could an event token inherently have truth 
conditions?’ Here, we see again King claiming that one can explain how something—a 
mental state token—can have truth conditions if agents interpret it, but cannot have 
truth conditions inherently. And he does not seem to see fit to look for any alternative, 
that they have truth conditions in some other way. But King also objects to the 
inheritance principle, that propositions have truth conditions in virtue of their ‘intrinsic 
connection’ with event tokens [...] which inherently have truth conditions.”  King objects 
(2012: 90) ‘even if we were to grant that [the tokens] did [inherently have truth 
conditions], why would this insure that the event type of which they are tokens has 
truth conditions?’ I shall revisit whether King himself can make use of related 
inheritance principles in §VIII. 
In all of these arguments, King seems to take his explanatory demand to 
establish that an entity has truth conditions only if agents are disposed to take it as 
having truth conditions. This claim seemingly underwrites King’s argument against 
both the traditional conception of propositions and against attitude-based accounts. As 
King (2009: 261) says, 
[A]ny [view] according to which propositions represent things as being a certain 
way and so have truth conditions in virtue of their very natures and 
independently of minds and languages is in the end completely mysterious and 
so unacceptable.  But then it seems that the answer to [the question of why 
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propositions have truth conditions] must have to do with something about us. 
[…] [I]t is something we speakers of languages do that results in propositions 
representing things as being a certain way and so having truth conditions.  
Thus, King thinks that propositions have truth conditions in virtue of ‘something we 
speakers of language do’. And this seems to be establishing interpretive conventions 
that dispose us to take the proposition as true or false under appropriate conditions. 
 
III. The Difficulty 
 We have seen that King is committed to two theses. First, he is committed to the 
view that propositions such as the proposition expressed by (J) have their truth 
conditions essentially. So the proposition that Mario jumps could not exist unless it is 
true just in case Mario jumps. Second, propositions have their truth conditions due to 
the dispositions and conventions of rational agents to take them as having truth 
conditions. 
These two claims create a prima facie difficulty for any account of propositions. 
For it seems contingent that human beings take the entities to be identified with 
propositions and not some other entities to have the relevant representational 
properties. Just as there might be beings who respond to sentence (J) by supposing that 
Luigi jumps, it seems as though there might be beings who relate to any given entities to 
be identified with propositions differently than we do. It is conceivable that a suitably 
disposed community might signal the entity to be identified with the proposition that 
Mario jumps in order to communicate that Mario doesn’t jump. This community might 
endow the relevant fact with a different representational significance.  
The prima facie difficulty is related to, but distinct from, an objection to King’s 
account of propositions developed by Speaks (2014: 153-154). Speaks worries that if 
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propositions have their truth conditions essentially, then speakers can do nothing to 
bestow truth conditions on them. All that speakers can do is make them exist or not.  
Speaks takes as a premise that if an entity has a property essentially, then its 
possession of that property cannot be explained by anything outside of it. I do not share 
that presupposition. Suppose that propositions were essentially attractive so that if they 
exist then—by necessity—they attract speakers to take them as having truth conditions. 
The fact that agents are disposed to take them as having truth conditions might then 
explain why the proposition has truth conditions. The disposition would in turn be 
explained by the intrinsic attraction. 
The prima facie difficulty is different. If propositions have truth conditions 
essentially but cannot have truth conditions unless rational agents are disposed to take 
them to be true or false, then propositions cannot exist unless rational agents are so 
disposed. But this means that propositions are essentially attractive in the sense 
described above. And it is peculiar that any entity could have this sort of essential 
attractiveness.7 More to the point, this essential attractiveness demands explanation 
just as much as the possession of truth conditions does. It is no advance to explain the 
possession of truth conditions in terms of the dispositions of rational agents, if one 
posits an unexplained necessary connection requiring rational agents to take 
propositions as having truth conditions. 
 King’s account, as I understand it, is meant to explain why a proposition cannot 
exist without being interpreted by rational agents. According to King, the existence of a 
proposition is tied up with the fact that speakers engage in interpretation. That is, the 
proposition could not exist unless speakers interpreted certain entities as having truth 
conditions. We shall see that King develops two strategies which attempt to use this 
interpretation-dependence in order to guarantee that propositions themselves have 
  Page 10 of 30 
truth conditions essentially. I will argue that neither of these strategies overcomes the 
prima facie difficulty. As a result, King has not succeeded in developing an account of 
propositions according to which they are essentially representational and have their 
possession of truth conditions explained by the dispositions of rational agents. 
 
IV. King’s Account 
 In this section, I develop the bare bones of King’s account of what propositions 
are.  In the following sections, I will explain why King thinks that propositions are 
essentially interpreted.  
On King’s account, a proposition is a fact, the exemplification of a property by a 
particular. Of course, the proposition that Mario jumps cannot be the fact that Mario 
jumps, the exemplification of the property of jumping by Mario, since the proposition 
that Mario jumps, but not the fact, can exist even while Mario is not jumping.  
 So which fact is the proposition that Mario jumps? Following Wittgenstein 
(1922/2005: 3.14), King argues that a sentence is a fact. Thus, (J) ‘Mario jumps’ consists 
in the words ‘Mario’ and ‘jumps’ standing in the relation of subject-predicate 
concatenation which King calls the sentential relation, R.  (J) is also a poor candidate to 
be the proposition. This is partially because speakers of different languages can express 
the proposition that Mario jumps, but they do not engage with the sentence ‘Mario 
jumps'. 
 More importantly, (J) does not have representational properties essentially. I 
mentioned above that speakers might have used the name ‘Mario’ differently, which 
would lead to the sentence having different truth conditions. Similarly, had speakers 
used the predicate ‘jumps’ differently, it would have expressed a different property with 
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corresponding implications for the truth conditions of (J). Or, again, they might have 
interpreted concatenation differently. 
 To remedy these problems, King seeks to exhibit a fact which has truth 
conditions essentially and intrinsically and which can be shared by speakers of different 
languages. The fact he offers is related to the fact that ‘Mario’ and ‘jumps’ stand in 
sentential relation R. First, King collects up the various representational properties of 
this sentence into a single conjunctive fact, including the fact that the name ‘Mario’ 
refers to Mario, the predicate ‘jumps’ expresses the property of jumping, and the fact 
that the sentential relation R encodes instantiation. Call this P(ropositional)-Fact 1. 
P-Fact1: R(‘Mario’,‘jumps’) & ‘Mario’ refers to Mario & ‘jumps’ expresses the 
property of jumping & R encodes instantiation 
P-Fact1 is not the proposition that Mario jumps. It may be common for speakers of 
English to consider this fact when considering the proposition that Mario jumps. But 
monolingual German speakers don’t. 
 Thus, King moves to P-Fact2 which existentially generalizes on the specific 
expressions. 
P-Fact2: ∃n∃p(R(n,p) & n refers to Mario & p expresses the property of 
jumping & R encodes instantiation) 
P-Fact2 exists iff there is a subject and predicate that make a sentence, where the 
subject refers to Mario, the predicate expresses the property of jumping, and the 
sentence-forming relation encodes instantiation. King (2009: 270-1) suggests that 
speakers of different languages have access to P-Fact2 when they make use of sentences 
synonymous with ‘Mario jumps’. Thus, P-Fact2 is well suited to be the kind of meaning 
that is common to all sentences synonymous with ‘Mario jumps’ and to be the object of 
the attitude expressed by this sentence.8  
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V. The Prima Facie Difficulty Applied to King’s View 
 The existence of P-Fact2 requires that speakers do some interpreting. In order 
for P-Fact2 to exist speakers must interpret a sentence. Yet, King’s account—described 
thus far—does not say that speakers to take P-Fact2 itself to have truth conditions. For 
this reason, nothing said so far guarantees that F-Fact2 has truth conditions at all, much 
less that it has them essentially. As King (2009: 264) emphasizes, ‘there is no reason to 
think that [P-Fact2] has truth conditions and so is either true or false.’ The existence of 
P-Fact2 guarantees that the existence of a sentence that is true just in case Mario jumps. 
But for P-Fact2 to have truth conditions— King believes—speakers must be disposed to 
take P-Fact2 itself as true under given circumstances. And, without further discussion, 
there could be creatures wholly indifferent to P-Fact2. 
 I take the fact that it is conceivable that speakers are indifferent to P-Fact2 to 
create a very strong presumption in favor of its being possible. King is in no position to 
posit an unexplained necessary connection mandating that speakers interpret P-Fact2 
in a certain way. If the necessary connection is not explained, then proponents of 
traditional conceptions of propositions as inherently representational could retort that 
on their own view, the representational capacities of propositions arise because 
rational agents necessarily interpret the propositions as having truth conditions, though 
this necessary connection cannot be explained. 
This impression of contingency is also supported by King’s own discussion. King 
(2007: 61; 2009: 266-7) tells a just-so story according to which the sentential relation R 
is taken to ascribe instantiation, but agents as yet have no reaction to the proposition. 
They then introduce ‘that’-clauses whose most eligible referents are facts such as P-
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Fact2, which they ‘without thinking and implicitly’ (2009: 267) take to be true if the 
corresponding sentences are true. 
King does not intend this story to be literally true. That is, he does not believe 
that the interpretation of the sentence occurs temporally prior to the interpretation of 
the proposition. Rather, the temporal priority of the just-so story is meant to make 
plausible the idea that the interpretation of the sentence is explanatorily prior to the 
interpretation of a proposition.9 
Even if the just-so story is not meant to be actually true, it does seem possibly 
true. Indeed, it would be strange for King to illustrate how his view is supposed to work 
by describing a case that he himself beliefs is impossible. But if the just-so story is 
possibly true, then it is possible for P-Fact2 to exist without being taken to have truth 
conditions and—therefore—without having them. 
As King has set things up, in order for P-Fact2 to have truth conditions, it does 
not suffice that speakers merely take sentence (J) as having truth conditions. They must 
take P-Fact2 itself to have truth conditions. I take this to reflect the principle above that 
in order for something to have truth conditions, agents must be disposed to take it as 
having truth conditions. But we’ve seen that there is a strong presumption that it is 
possible that P-Fact2 exist, but speakers fail to take any attitude at all towards P-Fact2. 
King’s own just-so story illustrates the conceivability of such a state-of-affairs. And 
absent some further story about why speakers must be disposed to take P-Fact2 as 
having truth conditions given that it exists, we should be wary of positing that they 
must be so disposed. More explicitly, the argument may be formulated as follows. 
(1) Necessarily: (x has truth conditions only if agents are disposed to take x as 
having truth conditions). 
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(2) The proposition that Mario jumps is identical to P-Fact2, the fact that agents 
take some sentence, subject term of which denotes Mario and predicate term 
expresses jumping and whose concatenation relation encodes instantiation. 
(3) It is possible that P-Fact2 exists because there is a sentence whose subject 
term denotes Mario and predicate term expresses jumping and whose 
concatenation relation encodes instantiation without speakers taking P-Fact2 
to have truth conditions. (By the default presumption and the possibility of 
King’s just-so story.) 
(4) In any world in which there is a sentence whose subject term denotes Mario 
and predicate term expresses jumping and whose concatenation relation 
encodes instantiation, a duplicate of P-Fact2 exists.10 
(5) Therefore, it is possible for the proposition that Mario jumps to exist without 
having truth conditions. (By 1 and 3) 
(6) Therefore, it is possible for a duplicate of the proposition that Mario jumps to 
exist without having truth conditions. (By 1 and 4) 
The argument establishes that the proposition that Mario jumps has truth conditions 
neither essentially (by 5) nor intrinsically (by 6).  
 The weakest point of the argument is (3). It rests on the default presumption 
that an agent could interpret a sentence without interpreting the proposition it 
expresses. The presupposition against positing unexplained necessary connections 
requiring speakers to interpret things seems to be a very deep feature of King’s view. 
The conceivability of the just-so story reinforces the need for King to say something 
more to ensure that speakers not only do interpret P-Fact2, but that they must interpret 
it if it exists. If King could explain why there is a necessary connection guaranteeing that 
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speakers interpret the proposition that Mario jumps, if it exists, then he could resist 
premise (3). 
 I will examine two independent strategies that King develops which might seem 
to deliver such an explanation. One strategy involves going into detail about how 
speakers interpret the sentential relation. On this account, speakers cannot interpret 
the sentential relation without also interpreting the proposition. The other strategy 
involves identifying the proposition that Mario jumps not with P-Fact2, but with the 
“slightly larger” fact that P-Fact2 is interpreted. I will argue that neither strategy can 
explain why the proposition that Mario jumps is essentially such that it is interpreted by 
rational agents as having truth conditions. 
 
VI. Interpreting the Sentential Relation 
The existence of P-Fact2 guarantees that sentence (J) exists and is interpreted as 
being true just in case Mario jumps. In recent work, King has tried to tell an explicit 
story about how agents who interpret (J) are in a position to access and interpret P-
Fact2 as well. Speaks (2014: 152, footnote 5) suggests that the interpretation of (J) is 
‘metaphysically sufficient’ for the interpretation of P-Fact2. In particular, he suggests 
that interpreting the sentential relation of subject-predicate concatenation in (J) 
necessarily entails interpreting P-Fact2. King (2014b: 187, footnote 3) seems to agree 
on this front. In this section, I examine King’s explicit story about how agents go from 
interpreting the sentential relation to interpreting the proposition itself. I argue that—
despite some appearance to the contrary—there is no reason to think that interpreting 
the sentential relation metaphysically suffices for interpreting the propositional relation. 
One might have thought that the sentence (J) is interpreted as having truth 
conditions as follows. Speakers confront a sentence such as (J) which contains a subject 
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term referring to Mario and a predicate term expressing jumping. While having (J) in 
mind, the speakers interpret the sentence as being true just in case Mario instantiates 
jumping, and they are similarly disposed for any sentence exhibiting the same syntactic 
relation.  
This is not King’s view, however. On King’s view, speakers manifest their 
disposition to interpret (J) as having truth conditions in a different way. When they 
confront (J), speakers are inclined to abstract from the specific lexical items. That is, 
King (197ff ) thinks that if one entertains to the fact that ‘Mario’ refers to Mario, ‘jumps’ 
expresses jumping, and ‘Mario’, and ‘jumping’ stand in R, then ‘one is thereby in a 
position’ to have in mind the fact that there is a name referring to Mario, there is a 
predicate that expresses jumping, and the name and the predicate stand in a relation 
that encodes instantiation. The speaker is thereby able to have P-Fact2 ‘in mind’ in 
order to interpret it. As King (2014b: 198) says, 
Not only does it seem plausible that one is able to abstract from features of a 
witness fact in this way, thereby having the fact it witnesses in mind, but it also 
seems plausible that we do this in moving from having a sentence in mind to 
interpreting the propositional relation of the sentence expressed by the sentence 
and thus understanding the sentence. 
So King’s view is that speakers who interpret (J) also are in a position to have P-Fact2 in 
mind. Indeed, King thinks that they actually do have P-Fact2 in mind. 
 On King’s view, it is only after the speakers have P-Fact2 in mind that they 
interpret (J). As King (2014a: 55) describes the process of interpreting a sentence such 
as (J): 
Semantic values only get composed once in understanding the sentence [(J)], and 
hence entertaining the proposition [P-Fact2].  
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In particular, speakers first perform the abstraction described above.  
Only now are the semantic values composed, and so the semantic significance of 
the sentential relation of [‘Mario jumps’] is now cashed in. Thereby, the property 
of [jumping] is ascribed to [Mario]. However, since it is the fact that is the 
proposition that [Mario jumps] that we have in mind when semantic values are 
composed, we count as interpreting its propositional relation as ascribing the 
property of [jumping] to [Mario]. So interpreting the sentential relation in the 
way we do, by composing semantic values in a certain way at a certain point in 
the process just described, just is interpreting the propositional relation in the 
relevant way. (King 2014b: 200) 
If all that King says is right, then rational agents cannot interpret the sentence (J) in 
precisely the way that actual rational agents interpret (J) without thereby interpreting 
P-Fact2 as having the same truth conditions as (J).11 This account, particularly the claim 
that interpreting the sentential relation in (J) ‘just is’ interpreting P-Fact2, might suggest 
that P-Fact2 is essentially such that agents interpret it, if it exists. 
 For the sake of argument, I grant that entertaining a fact can put one in a position 
to entertain its existential generalization. In particular, I grant that entertaining the 
interpreted sentence puts one in a position to entertain P-Fact2. Notice, however, the 
language of permissions, potentials, and possibilities in these formulations. The 
formulations do not at all suggest that an agent who has a fact such as (J) in mind must 
have its existential generalization in mind.  
Moreover, I grant that the claim that actual rational agents do interpret (J) in the 
way described. What is missing, however, is any reason to think that speakers must take 
(J) as having truth conditions by first accessing P-Fact2. Suppose that King has indeed 
established that all actual event tokens that fall under the type interpreting sentence (J) 
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also fall under the type interpreting P-Fact2. That is, suppose that King has established 
that speakers who interpret sentence (J) also interpret P-Fact2. Then, King will have 
established a sense in which interpreting sentence (J) just is interpreting P-Fact2. But 
we must not be misled into thinking that it follows from that that necessarily any time 
(J) is interpreted, P-Fact2 is also interpreted.  
For a comparison, it may be the case that every time one flips a switch a light 
turns on. There would then be a sense in which flipping the switch just is turning on the 
light. In particular, they are the same event token. But that does not mean that 
necessarily any flip-switching event is also a light-turning-on event. So I take it that the 
fact that speakers actually manifest their disposition to interpret (J) by thinking of P-
Fact2 does not give us any reason to think that necessarily any agent who interprets (J) 
thereby interprets P-Fact2. It therefore does not explain why P-Fact2 is interpreted 
whenever it exists.  
Indeed, if King’s notion of having P-Fact2 in mind is meant to be realistically 
psychologically implemented, it’s hard to see why it would be necessary that anyone 
who thinks of (J) thereby also thinks of its existential generalization, even if in a position 
to do so.  That is, King seemingly means that when agents interpret sentence (J), there is 
a genuine psychological process of generalizing to P-Fact2 and it is only after this 
process is completed that speakers compose the semantic values of the terminal nodes 
of (J). If this is right, it is hard to see how this auxiliary process could be necessarily 
involved in composing the terminal nodes of the sentence. 
On the other hand, King might deny there is a genuine auxiliary process going on 
inside the speaker. There is nothing psychologically or real other than the 
interpretation of (J). It’s just that any speaker who interprets the sentence (J) also 
‘counts as’ interpreting its existential generalization P-Fact2, and does so of necessity. 
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Such a view, however, seems to re-introduce the idea that there is simply a necessary 
connection forcing any rational agent who interprets the sentential relation to interpret 
the proposition. The fact that the existence of P-Fact2 guarantees that speakers have 
interpreted sentence (J), therefore, seems to offer no reason to suppose that it is a 
necessary truth that speakers are disposed to interpret P-Fact2, if it exists. It therefore 
offers no reason to believe that P-Fact2 has its truth conditions essentially or 
intrinsically. 
 
VII. Enlarging The Proposition  
 King (2007: 60; 2012: 81) offers a different account of why the proposition that 
Mario jumps has truth conditions essentially. This account involves rejecting the view 
that the proposition that Mario jumps is identical to P-Fact2. 
P-Fact2: ∃n∃p(R(n,p) & n refers to Mario & p expresses the property of 
jumping & R encodes instantiation) 
King considers the relationship between Mario and the property of jumping in P-Fact2. 
He calls this the propositional relation (PR): 
(PR): PR(x,y) =def ∃n∃p(R(n,p) & n refers to x & p expresses y & R encodes 
instantiation) 
King argues that the proposition that Mario jumps has truth conditions only if the 
propositional relation encodes instantiation. This, again, derives from a contingent fact 
about human beings. King (2007: 60) says, ‘What is the explanation for why the 
propositional relation [...] encodes the instantiation function? From the standpoint of 
the current view, certainly it must be something that we and our linguistic ancestors 
did.’  
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As we have seen, however, this guarantees that P-Fact2 has truth conditions but 
it does not guarantee that P-Fact2 has truth conditions essentially. P-Fact2 has truth 
conditions due to our contingent activities. As King (2012: 77) says, ‘Encoding 
ascription understood in this way, note, is a relational property of the propositional 
relation itself[.]’  
 For this reason, King (2012: 77) points to an enlarged fact, which he now 
identifies with the proposition: ‘let's understand the proposition that [Mario jumps] to 
be [P-Fact2], taken together with the propositional relation having the relational 
property of encoding ascription ([...]the fact that is the proposition that [Mario jumps] is 
a slightly ‘‘larger'' fact than we have taken it to be to this point, since it now includes the 
propositional relation possessing a certain relational property).’12 For King, the 
proposition that Mario jumps is the conjunctive fact (i) that Mario and jumping stand in 
the propositional relation and (ii) that the propositional relation encodes instantiation. 
I’ll call this fact P-Fact3 
P-Fact3: PR(Mario,the property of jumping) & PR encodes instantiation. 
King (2012: 81) argues that identifying the proposition that Mario jumps with P-Fact3 
guarantees that this proposition has its truth conditions essentially.13 Indeed, King 
(2007: 61ff) seems to move from the claim that the proposition is identical to P-Fact3 to 
the claim that the proposition has truth conditions essentially. 
We now claim that the fact that is the proposition that [Mario jumps] includes 
the propositional relation possessing the property of encoding the instantiation 
function. This being so, having truth conditions, and having the particular truth 
conditions it has, is an intrinsic and essential property of the proposition that 
[Mario jumps]. 
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I will now argue that this inference is invalid. The fact that the propositional relation PR 
encodes instantiation does not guarantee that the proposition that Mario jumps—that 
is, P-Fact3—has truth conditions. 
Once again, P-Fact3 requires that what King calls the propositional relation, PR, 
encodes instantiation.  But it is misleading to label PR the propositional relation. An 
object and a property, say Mario and jumping, may stand in relation PR without the 
proposition that Mario jumps existing. Mario and jumping stand in PR just in case P-
Fact2 exists. And, P-Fact2 may exist without the proposition that Mario jumps existing. 
It is additionally needed that PR encodes instantiation. But this only guarantees that P-
Fact3 exists, not that it has truth conditions. In order for the proposition that Mario 
jumps to exist—or, equivalently, for P-Fact3 to exist—Mario and the property of 
jumping must be related by a different relation from PR, say propositional relation*: 
(PR*) PR*(x,y) =def (PR(x,y) & PR encodes instantiation) 
Given premise (1) above, that necessarily (x has truth conditions only if agents are 
disposed to take x as having truth conditions), it follows that the fact that PR encodes 
instantiation is not enough for P-Fact3 to have truth conditions. Rather, in order for P-
Fact3 to have truth conditions, PR* must encode instantiation. And this is not 
guaranteed by the existence of P-Fact3. Parroting King, we may say, ‘there is no reason 
to think that [P-Fact3] has truth conditions and so is either true or false’, since there is 
no reason to think that speakers take PR* to encode instantiation. 
This problem leads to a regress reminiscent of Bradley (1893/2002). If fact C1 is 
identified with the proposition that Mario jumps, then it is possible that C1 exists, but 
agents to not take it to have truth conditions. It would thus lack truth conditions. King 
responds that the proposition is not really C1, but C2: C1 together with the fact that 
agents take C1 to have truth conditions. But, once again, the existence of C2 cannot 
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guarantee that agents take it to have truth conditions. So we need a further fact, C3: C2 
together with the fact that C2 has truth conditions. And so on. 
VIII. Inheritance Principles 
Before moving on, I will respond to a potential objection. One might hold that P-
Fact3 inherits truth conditions from P-Fact2, because they stand in an intimate 
relationship. On such a view, in order for something to have truth conditions, agents 
don’t need to be disposed to interpret that very thing as having truth conditions. Rather, 
an entity can inherit its truth conditions from something else that has them. So perhaps, 
King could argue that P-Fact3 is appropriately related to P-Fact2, which has truth 
conditions. Namely, P-Fact3 contains P-Fact2 as a constituent and P-Fact3 also contains 
the fact that P-Fact2 is interpreted. So maybe this is an appropriate relationship 
allowing P-Fact3 to inherit truth conditions from P-Fact2 without itself being 
interpreted. 
I want to first note that I doubt that King himself actually endorses such 
inheritance principles, though it may be an improvement of the view he actually holds. 
As I mentioned above, King has already given reason—in his response to Soames 
(2010)—for questioning such inheritance principles. Soames believes that belief tokens 
(or tokens of some relevant attitude) have truth conditions and tries to generalize that 
certain entities appropriately related to them, namely belief types, have truth conditions. 
King, for the sake of argument, grants that the tokens have truth conditions. But he sees 
no reason to infer that belief types do. I don’t see how King can freely pick and choose 
which inheritance relations are appropriate and which aren’t.  
 More importantly, as I mentioned above, King (2009: 264) says that there is ‘no 
reason’ to think that P-Fact2 has truth conditions even though it is intimately related to 
the sentence (J) which has truth conditions. Indeed, the relationship between P-Fact2 
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and (J) is almost identical to the relationship between P-Fact3 and P-Fact2. Specifically, 
P-Fact2 is the result of conjoining the fact (J) with the fact that the sentential relation 
binding (J) together encodes instantiation and then existentially generalizing on the 
lexical items in (J). On the other hand, P-Fact3 is the result of conjoining P-Fact2 with 
the fact that the propositional relation encodes instantiation. These relations, it seems 
to me, are so close that if King thought that an entity could have truth conditions by 
being suitably related to an entity with truth conditions, then he would need to offer 
some reason why the relationship between P-Fact2 and (J) is not suitable for P-Fact2 to 
inherit its truth conditions from (J). As we have seen, King instead offers a complicated 
and speculative account according to which speakers who interpret (J) thereby also 
interpret P-Fact2 and so directly endow it with truth conditions.  
The only difference of potential relevance between the relationship between P-
Fact2 and (J) and the relationship between P-Fact3 and P-Fact2 is that P-Fact3 contains 
P-Fact2 as a constituent, while P-Fact2 does not contain (J) as a constituent, because it 
existentially generalizes on the nodes in (J). But King has already given reasons for 
questioning the relevance of constituency to representation. The Platonic conception of 
propositions as abstract structured wholes containing individuals and properties (and 
even instantiation) does not guarantee that the whole represents that the individuals 
instantiate the properties. More importantly, there are many facts that contain P-Fact2, 
but don't have truth conditions. The conjunction of P-Fact2 and the fact that Luigi runs 
contains P-Fact2, but lacks truth conditions. So why expect P-Fact3, but not this other 
fact, to inherit its truth conditions from its constituent?  
Thus, given that King does not take (J) to bestow P-Fact2 with truth conditions 
merely in virtue of their intrinsic connection (but only in virtue of what we do), it would 
be baffling for him to then turn to say that P-Fact2 does indeed bestow P-Fact3 with 
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truth conditions regardless of whether agents take P-Fact3 to have truth conditions at 
all. The relationships are simply too close to make a difference to whether one fact could 
inherit its representational properties from another fact. And the relevant difference 
(constituency) does not automatically have representational import.  
Regardless of whether this is King’s actual view, is it an option for him? I don’t 
believe so. King’s whole approach is motivated by the claim that the traditional 
conception of propositions is mysterious. According to King, it is mysterious that 
propositions could have truth conditions that are not explained by interpretive 
activities of human beings. But it seems equally mysterious that interpreting one entity 
and so endowing it with truth conditions would automatically endow some other entity 
with truth conditions. Moreover, the relationships would have to be so highly specific 
that interpreting a sentence such as (J) does not result in endowing P-Fact2 with truth 
conditions, but interpreting P-Fact2 does result in endowing P-Fact3 with truth 
conditions. The inheritance would have to follow from the fact that P-Fact3 contains P-
Fact2 as a constituent and also contains the fact that the propositional relation in P-
Fact2 is interpreted. But, once again, there are many facts that contain exactly these 
constituents: for instance, the fact that conjoins (i) P-Fact2, (ii) the claim that PR 
encodes instantiations, and (iii) the fact that P-Fact2 is self-identical. Interestingly, what 
I have called P-Fact1 stands in the same relation to (J) that P-Fact3 stands in to P-Fact2. 
So embracing the current inheritance principle would problematically mandate that P-
Fact1 has truth conditions, provided that (J) does. So, it seems as though the relevant 
inheritance principle would have to be even more refined. Thus, in order for P-Fact3 to 
inherit its truth conditions from P-Fact2, the inheritance would have to flow through 
idiosyncratic and highly specific channels.  At very least, the principle allowing one 
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entity to inherit truth conditions for another would have to be gerrymandered to the 
extent that it is doubtful that it could be explanatory. 
 
IX. Identification and Self-Reference 
The argument above would be blocked if P-Fact2 is identical to P-Fact3. On this 
view, P-Fact3 —by guaranteeing that P-Fact2 has truth conditions—guarantees that P-
Fact3 has truth conditions. This response also blocks the regress alluded to above. King 
wants to offer an object which (a) has truth conditions bestowed by rational agents and 
(b) has them intrinsically. In order for a target fact C1 to have truth conditions, King 
believes that rational agents must take it to have truth conditions. Thus, he supposes 
that there is another fact C2, which is the fact that rational agents regard C1 as having 
certain truth conditions. C2 is then taken to be the proposition in question. But what 
bestows truth conditions on C2?  
The regress is blocked because, at some stage, the fact C1 is identical to the new 
fact C2, the fact that rational agents regard C1 as having certain truth conditions. If this 
identification holds, then propositions have their truth conditions intrinsically. For, 
propositions would not be able to exist unless rational agents regarded them as having 
truth conditions 
Unfortunately, the identification of P-Fact2 and P-Fact3 fails. If King’s just-so story 
obtains, then P-Fact2 could exist without P-Fact3 existing. Thus, they cannot be 
identical. As Caplan and Tillman (2012: §5.1) note, King also says that P-Fact3 is “larger” 
than P-Fact2. This suggests that the operative conception of facts is one on which a 
conjunctive fact contains its conjuncts as constituents. P-Fact3 has a constituent lacked 
by P-Fact2. Namely, that PR encodes instantiation. 
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But this raises an interesting possibility. P-Fact3 requires that Mario and the 
property of jumping stand in the propositional relation PR and that PR encode 
instantiation. I objected that PR was defined as the relation that holds together P-Fact2. 
So this does not entail that the relation that holds together P-Fact3, PR*, is interpreted 
as encoding instantiation. Could King face this problem directly by defining a 
propositional relation, PR**, such that  PR** must itself encode instantiation in order for 
x and y to stand in PR**? 
 (PR**): PR**(x,y) =def (PR(x,y) & PR** encodes instantiation) 
Let P-Fact4 be the fact that Mario and the property of jumping stand in PR**. It would 
necessarily follow from the existence of P-Fact4 that speakers (are disposed to) take P-
Fact4 to be true just in case Mario jumps. Thus, P-Fact4 essentially has the right truth 
conditions. This blocks the regress argument alluded to above.14 PR** occurs in its own 
definition. There is nothing inherently untoward about this, but it is bizarre to think 
that rational agents take PR** to encode anything. I submit that we rarely have such 
self-referential attitudes, and that there is no reason to make an exception for PR**. 
 
X. Conclusion 
 King maintains that encoding instantiation is a relational property of the 
propositional relation. It depends on the dispositions of rational agents to interpret 
instances of the propositional relation as having truth conditions. It depends on 
“something we do” which is “outside” the proposition. To guarantee that propositions 
have truth conditions intrinsically and essentially, King sought to characterize an object 
the existence of which necessitates that speakers interpret it a certain way.  But rational 
agents are notoriously fickle. And it is possible for them to be disposed to behave in 
myriad unwise and theoretically unwelcome ways. The very scenarios King describes so 
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eloquently—the possibility that they interpret the sentential relation differently or the 
possibility that they interpret structured complexes differently—testify to this fact. 
Simply put, there is no unproblematic entity that requires rational agents to have any 
particular reaction. We should be wary of any view that requires these reactions.15 
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1 This is also King’s (2012: 89-90) expression. 
2 This argument, as far as I can tell, is new in the literature. But a hint can be found in 
Caplan and Tillman (2012: footnote 43). Speaks (2014: 153-154) also develops a 
related, but distinct objection. 
3King believes that English speakers lack conscious control over whether they interpret 
concatenation. It is a contingent biological and sociological fact that they do so. Yet, 
differently constituted agents may have done differently. And doing so, they would have 
bestowed different truth conditions on the sentence. Higginbotham (2008; 2009) also 
explores this issue. 
4 Perhaps one might preserve the letter, if not the spirit, of the slogan that pieces of 
information depend only on the state of the world for their truth-values by holding that 
pieces of information are only contingently pieces of information. This would mean that 
given that something is a piece of information, its truth-value is determined solely by the 
state of the world, but the piece of information might have had different truth 
conditions or none whatsoever. Note, however, that it also seems strange to assert: ‘the 
proposition that Mario jumps is such that it could exist without being true even though 
Mario jumps’.  
5 Wittgenstein (1922/2005: 4.062) hints at this idea. 
6See the exchange between Frege and Russell in (Frege and Gabriel 1980: 163, 169). See 
Keller (2014) for criticism of structured complex accounts of propositions. 
7 There is some relation between the prima facie difficulty and worries about moral 
judgment internalism, the view that judgments about moral properties are pro tanto 
motivating. See discussion in Foot (1972) and Mackie (1977/1990). 
8 King refines his view to accommodate the presence of context sensitive expressions in 
English. This makes no difference to my discussion. 
9 Soames (2010) interpreted King as committed to the literal temporal priority. See 
discussion in Soames (2014: 174ff). 
10 I assume here that a fact just is the instantiation of a property by some objects. Thus, I 
assume that a proposition’s intrinsic nature is given by enumerating these objects and 
their arrangements. What’s most important, however, is that dispositions of rational 
agents to behave in certain ways toward the fact don’t seem intrinsic in any traditional 
sense. 
11 Caplan and Tillman (2012: 6-7) also point out that King (2012: 10) thinks that it ‘just 
isn’t coherent’ for speakers to interpret P-Fact2 as having different truth conditions 
than (J). They rightly respond that it is nonetheless possible. But their response can be 
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bolstered by consideration of the fact that what is coherent depends on mode of 
presentation. So, under a different mode of presentation—say a different coding 
system—speakers might with perfect coherence interpret P-Fact2 as having radically 
different truth conditions from (J). 
12 See also (King 2007: 60). 
13 Similarly, King (2012, 81): ‘Propositions as I understand them have their truth 
conditions intrinsically: the fact that is the proposition that Michael swims includes its 
propositional relation having the relational property of encoding ascription. As such, 
any duplicate of this fact will have the same truth conditions it does and so the 
fact/proposition has its truth conditions intrinsically.’ 
14 For this account to work, PR** must uniquely specify a property. Otherwise, King 
must specify which property is the propositional relation. King could borrow from the 
work of Barwise and Etchemendy (1989) in which circular definitions can uniquely 
specify a proposition. 
15 Thanks to the comments of multiple anonymous referees at Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, the paper was significantly improved. I have benefitted from discussion with 
Brian Rabern, Anders Schoubye, Patrick Todd, and Giuliano Torrengo. Special thanks are 
due to Ben Caplan and Jeff Speaks for detailed comments on an early draft. The research 
leading to these results benefited from partial funds from projects CSD2009–00056, 
FFI2012-35026, and FFI2012-37658 (Spanish Government) and from the LOGOS Group 
2014-SGR-81 (Catalan Government). 
 
